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Abstract 
Law, religion and organ transplants 
Currently any organ donation in South Africa, whether from a 
living or a dead donor, is donated altruistically, which means 
that it is the free choice of the donor or the family of the 
deceased to donate organs. There is no financial compensation 
for the donor. Nearly all religions support altruistic organ dona-
tions as it serves or promotes life. But, despite the positive atti-
tude of the followers of different faiths towards organ transplan-
tations, there is a worldwide shortage of transplantable organs, 
especially kidneys. Many patients die while waiting for a trans-
plant organ from an altruistic donor. The question may therefore 
be asked whether the different religions should not also support 
the clamouring for the financial rewarding of an organ donor. In 
this article the emphasis is on the Christian and Muslim faiths to 
try and fathom their position in this regard. In conclusion, how-
ever, we argue that financial compensation to donors, as a 
general practice, should be allowed irrespective of religious 
arguments, as the decision to donate altruistically or to receive 
compensation is an expression of personal autonomy.  
Opsomming 
Die reg, geloof en orgaanskenkings 
Enige orgaanskenking in Suid-Afrika, hetsy ’n skenking van ’n 
lewende of ’n afgestorwe skenker, word tans op altruïstiese 
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gronde gedoen. Dit beteken dit is die keuse van die skenker of 
die familie van die oorledene om ’n orgaan te skenk of nie. Daar 
is geen finansiële vergoeding vir die skenker nie. Byna alle ge-
lowe regverdig altruïstiese orgaanskenkings, omdat dit lewens 
kan red en lewensgehalte kan verbeter. Ten spyte van die posi-
tiewe houding van die navolgers van verskeie gelowe ten opsig-
te van orgaanoorplantings, is daar steeds ’n wêreldwye tekort 
aan oorplantbare organe, veral niere. Baie pasiënte sterf terwyl 
hulle op ’n oorplanting wag. Die vraag kan daarom tereg gevra 
word of die verskillende gelowe nie die aandrang om finansiële 
vergoeding vir skenkers behoort te steun nie. In hierdie artikel 
val die klem op die Christen- en Moslemgelowe om hulle posi-
sie in hierdie verband te probeer peil. Daar word tot die slotsom 
gekom dat ’n praktyk wat vergoeding aan skenkers toelaat 
moontlik moet wees, afgesien van godsdienstige beskouings 
daaroor, aangesien orgaanskenking ’n uitdrukking van persoon-
like outonomiteit is. Dit is die uitdrukking van selfbeskikking wat 
aan ’n persoon die reg gee om self te besluit of hy/sy ’n orgaan 
altruïsties wil skenk of daarvoor vergoed wil word. 
1. Introduction 
Medical practitioners have always been confronted with the chal-
lenge of not only healing patients, but also of prolonging life. As a 
result of intensive research and blood experimentation, different 
blood types were identified and risks associated with blood trans-
fusions decreased considerably. Based on the success with blood 
transfusions, doctors started to consider the possibility of replacing 
defective human organs with healthy organs from deceased persons 
(cadavers). They surgically removed an organ from a brain dead1 
person and replaced it in a patient to improve the health of the reci-
pient. Today, after years of experimentation, not only cadavers but 
also living donors are used.2 Currently any donation, whether it is 
from a living or a deceased donor, is done altruistically, which 
means it is the choice of the donor or his/her family to donate organs 
or not, and there is no financial compensation for the donor (or 
donor’s family).  
                                      
1 This article will not address the different religious views on brain death. For a 
discussion on brain death, see Ott (1998:16-23).  
2 Most living donors donate a kidney, although parts of a liver lobe can also be 
transplanted from a living donor. This article will focus on kidneys. 
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Most, if not all, religions accept altruistic organ donations and justify 
it because it saves and promotes life. But, despite the positive 
attitude of the followers of different faiths towards organ transplant-
ations and altruistic donations, there is an immense global shortage 
of transplantable organs, specifically kidneys. Because the supply 
cannot satisfy the demand, illegal activities might and are in fact 
taking place between a willing buyer (the patient) and a person who 
needs money and is willing to sell his/her kidney (Liebenberg, 2010: 
2).3 The question can, therefore, rightly be asked whether the diffe-
rent religions should not support the clamour for the financial re-
warding of the donor. Rewarding donors financially could persuade 
more people to come forward as organ donors, and by doing so 
more lives could be saved, which is in line with the promotion of life. 
In the first section of this article the focus will be on the present state 
of organ donations. We discuss different types of transplants, the 
shortage of transplantable organs globally, the legal context of organ 
transplantations in South Africa, and the fallacy of the ‘“gift of life”’ 
view. We provide an abbreviation of a small sample of religious 
worldviews on altruistic donations and transplantations, and indicate 
that most religions do not address payment for donors, as the 
practice is illegal nearly worldwide (Garwood-Gowers, 1999:167-
194).  
In the second part of this article, financial reward to donors as a 
possible way of addressing the kidney shortage will be investigated. 
The spotlight will be on the Christian and Islamic faiths, which 
constitute the two biggest religious groupings in the world. We will 
investigate the views of these two religious groups with regard to a 
donor who receives financial reward for donating an organ.  
In conclusion, we argue that financial compensation to donors 
should be allowed in order to give effect to personal autonomy. Each 
individual ought to decide according to his/her values and belief 
system whether to donate a kidney altruistically or to be rewarded – 
religious perceptions should not be a stumbling block.  
                                      
3 Netcare 911, a private hospital group in South Africa, pleaded guilty in a court 
case accusing the St Augustine’s Hospital (a Netcare hospital) in KwaZulu-Natal 
of performing illegal kidney transplants on Israeli patients, who alleged that 
persons from Brazil and Romania were their blood relatives but in reality were 
willing to sell a kidney (The State v Netcare Kwa-Zulu Natal, 2010).  
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2. Background 
2.1 Different types of transplantations 
There are four types of transplants that can be performed, namely 
auto grafts, isografts, homografts and xenografts. An auto graft re-
fers to the transplanting of an organ or tissue, such as skin or bone 
marrow, of a particular person to a different part of the body of the 
same person. This type of transplantation poses no ethical or reli-
gious problems as the donor and recipient are one and the same 
person. Isografts keep transplants of organs or tissue between 
genetically identical individuals such as identical twins – the first 
ever kidney transplant was performed in this way, but because 
identical twins are not common, this type of transplant is more of an 
exception than a rule. Homografts are transplants kept in the same 
biological realm, in other words an individual donates an organ to 
another individual of the same species (person to person). Since this 
is the most common type of transplant, it will be the focus of this 
article. Finally, xenografts are transplants between different species 
– animal to human (Varga, 1980:140; Caplan & Coelho, 1998:121-
132).  
2.2 From experiment to common procedure 
The first kidney transplant was performed in 1951 by David Hume in 
Boston. He used a cadaver kidney in an attempt to save the life of 
one of his patients but the attempt was unsuccessful (Varga, 1980: 
142). During the following four years, Dr Hume and his colleagues 
performed ten further kidney transplants. Most patients died soon 
after the transplants, but one survived for six months. This success 
instilled in them the confidence to continue. The first kidney trans-
plant regarded as a real success took place in 1954 and the organ 
was from a living donor. The recipient, who received an isograft from 
his twin brother, lived for eight years before dying of a heart attack 
(Varga, 1980:143-144). 
Initially, the rejection of transplanted organs in homografts posed a 
big problem. Peter Medawar, an immunologist and Nobel Prize win-
ner in 1960, contributed to the solution by advocating tissue typing 
on both the donor and the recipient before a transplant is performed 
to ensure that their tissues match. Doing this would prevent the 
recipients’ body from identifying the transplanted organ as “foreign”. 
If the transplanted organ is experienced as foreign the recipient’s 
immune system will attack the “new” organ in order to try and break 
it down. This is know as rejection. A breakthrough came in 1983 
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when a Swiss pharmaceutical company produced Cyclosporin which 
enables the body to suppress the rejection of foreign tissue selec-
tively (Varga, 1980:144). Unrelated donor kidneys could from then 
on be used and using kidneys from living persons to save patients 
became a reality. The ability to control tissue and organ rejection 
changed kidney transplants from sporadic experimental interven-
tions to nearly common practice. Even though kidney transplants are 
now nearly routine operations in many hospitals, the shortage of 
transplantable kidneys, however, prevents it from happening often 
enough.  
2.3 Organ shortages 
The shortage of transplantable organs cannot necessarily be linked 
to the system of organ procurement in a specific country, as no 
procuring system meets the demand. To procure organs the United 
States of America (Goodwin, 2006), the United Kingdom (Haddow, 
2006:324-328) and South Africa, among others, follow a system of 
opting-in. Opting-in relies on individuals to altruistically donate or-
gans voluntarily (Slabbert & Oosthuizen, 2007b:311-312). A pro-
spective donor indicates the wish to become a donor by signing a 
donor card (to be kept in the donor’s purse) or by simply informing 
the next of kin about the decision to donate organs (Blackbeard, 
2003:47-48). Unfortunately “the most significant aspect of this meth-
od of procuring transplant organs is its clear failure to secure any-
where near the number of organs that are required” (Goodwin, 
2006:9-10, 39; cf. also Taylor, 2005:5). 
In 2008 only 631 transplants (solid organs as well as corneas) were 
performed in South Africa, whereas approximately 3 500 people 
were in need of a new organ. To meet the need, at least 1 000 kid-
neys should be transplanted every year. But in 2007 and 2008 less 
than a quarter of these desperately needed transplants were per-
formed.4 
As in the United Kingdom, health workers in South Africa always 
approach the family of a deceased person for their consent before 
removing the organs – even in cases where the patient carries a 
                                      
4 The statistics are for both the public and the private health care sectors. There 
is no official national waiting list of patients waiting for a transplant in South 
Africa. The figures are therefore estimates. Statistics are available on the web-
site of the Organ Donor Foundation – a non-governmental organisation in South 
Africa promoting organ donations (http://www.odf.org.za). 
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donor card. Statistics show that if the family does not know how the 
deceased felt about an organ donation, 30% will not consent to an 
organ removal (Haddow, 2006:324).  
In 2004 86 173 people were on the nation’s organ transplant waiting 
list in the USA. Seventeen patients died every day while waiting for 
an organ, whereas 115 patients were added daily to the waiting list 
(Kishore, 2005:362). In 2006 more than 93 000 patients needed an 
organ transplant, but only 14 699 transplants were performed (Statz, 
2006:1677-1678). Apart from the opting-in system, some states in 
America also follow a system known as required request (Slabbert & 
Oosthuizen, 2007a:47). Through this way of organ procurement, 
every person when admitted to hospital is asked to become an or-
gan donor. Despite the fact that both of these systems attempt to 
motivate people to become donors, there is still a dire need for 
transplantable organs and the demand far outnumbers the supply. 
“Those who can avoid America’s transplantation system will do so. 
They will bypass the American waiting list process for greater ac-
cess abroad, even if that choice involves paying a destitute living 
donor and violating the law.” (Goodwin, 2006:6.)  
The organ shortage is as critical in Europe. Austria, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Germany, the Netherlands, and Slovenia form part of Euro 
Transplant, an organisation within the European Union which moni-
tors organ transplant activities. In 2004 this organisation reported an 
organ shortage of 15 585. This shortage existed despite the fact that 
Belgium and Austria follow a system of opting-out (Taylor, 2005:24, 
footnote 23). According to this method of procuring organs, all 
citizens of a country are considered organ donors unless exclusion 
is requested before death. The trouble with this way of procuring 
organs is that it allows the state to take possession of a person’s 
property5 without consent, which might be seen as undermining per-
sonal autonomy (Taylor, 2005:23). The success of this way of pro-
curing organs is also dependent on the availability of a national 
database that enables hospital staff to determine quickly whether a 
deceased person has indicated unwillingness to be an organ donor. 
It may be deduced that such a “compulsory” system does not make 
a substantial difference to the acute shortage of organs.  
                                      
5 Property rights in human organs are a separate topic and cannot be dealt with in 
this article. For a discussion on this topic see Slabbert (2009:499-517). 
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Although statistics of only a few countries were highlighted, they 
clearly indicate both a near worldwide organ shortage and the failure 
of current organ procurement systems to provide an adequate num-
ber of transplantable organs. Another obstacle in procuring organs 
might be the existing legislation in a country. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to look at the legislation in South Africa concerning organ trans-
plantations. 
3. Legal aspects of organ transplants in South Africa 
The National Health Act, 61 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003) came into 
effect on 2 May 2005. Section 93(1) of this Act repeals the Human 
Tissue Act, 65 of 1983 in total, but this will take effect only on a date 
fixed by the president as published in a Government gazette. In the 
interim the Human Tissue Act, 65 of 1983 and the regulations issued 
in terms thereof, remain in force. It is thus necessary to look at both 
these acts concerning organ transplantations.  
3.1 The Human Tissue Act, 65 of 1983 
The Human Tissue Act, 65 of 1983 (South Africa, 1983) stipulates in 
section 2 that anyone competent to make a will (sixteen years or 
older) may donate an organ by signing a document attested to by 
two competent witnesses (fourteen years or older), or by indicating 
this wish through a clause in a will, or orally before two competent 
witnesses. In other words, it is up to the individual to indicate his/her 
wish to be an organ donor. This is done while the donor is still alive 
and compos mentis (having full control of one’s mind), whereas the 
actual donation will take place only after death. In the absence of a 
donation made by a deceased before death, the Act stipulates that 
the deceased’s spouse, major child, parent, guardian, major brother 
or major sister may donate usable organs of the deceased after 
death (S2(2)(a)). In practice, this is what happens in almost every 
case, as hospital staff usually asks the relatives for a donation, 
irrespective of whether the deceased has indicated his/her willing-
ness to be an organ donor. If the relatives of a deceased cannot be 
traced, the Director-General of the Department of Health or any per-
son specifically authorised thereto, may, after all reasonable steps 
had been taken to locate the relevant family members, donate or-
gans of the deceased (S2(2)(b)).  
The moment of death is not addressed in the Human Tissue Act and 
the Act does not recognise brain stem death as death. The moment 
of death has a bearing on organ donations as all vital organs – the 
heart, lungs, kidneys and liver – may only be removed once a per-
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son is brain dead. Section 18 of the Act stipulates who may consent 
to an organ being harvested while still alive. Consent must be given 
in writing and in accordance with prescribed conditions.  
In South Africa, donations from living persons are accepted only if 
they are related to the patient or the patient’s spouse. If a friend or 
an altruistic donor wants to donate an organ, an application has to 
be lodged with the Department of Health. The Department will in-
vestigate the offer thoroughly, so as to determine that it is not for 
financial gain, as section 28 specifically prohibits any payment for 
donated human organs. 
3.2 The National Health Act, 61 of 2003 
Section 62 of the National Health Act, 61 of 2003 (South Africa, 
2003) generally has the same requirements for an organ donation in 
the case of a deceased donor as the Human Tissue Act, 65 of 1983. 
The only difference of any note is that the new Act in section 1 
acknowledges “brain death” as death. Section 55 addresses organ 
donations by living donors.  
Section 60(4)(a) states that it is an offence for a person who has 
donated tissue to receive any form of financial or other reward for 
such donation, except for the “reimbursement of reasonable costs” 
incurred by him/her to provide such donation. The Act does not in-
dicate what may be included as “reasonable costs”. Singapore has 
recently passed the Human Organ Transplant Act with a similar sti-
pulation. According to this act, costs that may be reimbursed include 
short- and long-term medical care, loss of income, travel, accommo-
dation and child care costs (Gutierrez, 2009). Singapore’s Minister 
of Health, Khaw Boon Wan, explained that the reason behind this is 
fairness – being fair to donors who suffer financial consequences as 
a result of their act of donation (Roth, 2009). 
The Organ Donor Foundation (SA) promotes organ donations 
among the public usually by using the slogan: “Give someone the 
gift of life”. The metaphor of “the gift of life” may aid public aware-
ness campaigns but according to Siminoff and Chillag (1999:35) it 
does not help the actual donating process. 
4. The “gift of life”  
The ideal transplant scenario is to harvest organs from brain dead 
patients, since these patients are dead but kept alive artificially by 
machines. These dead people have no further use for any of their 
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organs and if the necessary consent required by law is granted, the 
organs may be used to save the lives of people or to improve their 
quality of life. Harvesting transplant organs under these conditions is 
less controversial, yet less effective as well. Many families ap-
proached at a time of grief refuse permission for removal of organs 
from the bodies of their loved ones. If they do agree to donate some 
or all organs it is usually in the hope that the deceased will somehow 
live on in others; or it is a way to express their desire to help others, 
especially so that the death of the deceased would accrue meaning 
to them; they seldom think of it as a “gift of life” (Siminoff & Chillag, 
1999:36). 
As indicated earlier there is a dire need for transplantable organs, 
especially kidneys. A way of procuring enough kidneys to meet the 
full demand is by using unrelated living donors. Kidney recipients 
benefit significantly from living-donor organs. The one year survival 
period with a deceased-donor kidney is 94%, but with a living-donor 
kidney survival rises to 98%. Five year survival from a dead donor 
increases from 80% to 90% with a living donor. When a living donor 
is used, planning can be better, as the donor and the recipient are 
present. Living donors can be better screened for illnesses and 
immunological compatibility can be ensured (Munson, 2007:214). 
Persons outside the family circle should, therefore, also be allowed 
to donate a kidney. As explained above, legislation in South Africa 
prescribes that living donors should be related to or at least be the 
spouse of the recipient. Offering a kidney in these circumstances 
seems heroic in that a family member offers his/her kidney to be 
transplanted as “a gift of life”. But unfortunately in reality “… some of 
the so-called ‘voluntary’ related donors brought in by patients were 
very unwilling, but had been coerced into volunteering by other 
family members” (Kanniyakonil, 2009). If the law could be changed 
to allow unrelated living donors, and to reimburse their costs in-
curred with the donation as provided for in the new Act (61 of 2003), 
it will be a first step in the direction of a better dispensation.  
Sque and Payne (1996:1367) suggest that “organ transplantation is 
sociologically and psychologically related to the dynamics of gift ex-
change, as monetary reimbursement for organs is outlawed in most 
developed countries”. In contrast, Fox and Swazey (1992:33) point 
out that recipients often believe they owe the organ donor some-
thing. The psychological and moral burden to repay “their” donor 
then weighs heavily on them, especially since the “gift” they received 
is so extraordinary that it is inherently unreciprocal. 
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Marshall et al. (1996:1-18) report meeting a man who received a 
kidney transplant in Madras, India. The donor came to his house to 
find out how he was doing. He (the recipient) wanted to know the 
same from the donor, whereupon the donor complained about se-
vere pain. The recipient gave him money for medicine as he felt he 
had to help him because he saved his life. He even explained he 
would give him more money should he ask again. It thus seems that 
in many (perhaps most cases) a donor’s altruistic gift became an 
obligatory burden to the recipient. Had the donor received a rea-
sonable amount of money for his inconvenience from the start, such 
moral baggage would not have been necessary for the recipient to 
carry. 
This view is supported by Radcliff-Richards (1991:190-193), who 
writes about a Turkish father who arranged to sell a kidney in order 
to pay for urgent hospital treatment for his little daughter. Because 
he was poor and desperate, selling a kidney was his only option – 
this very fact shows how unspeakably bad his circumstances must 
have been. Because the selling of kidneys are forbidden, his only 
viable option was ruled out and he was prevented from saving two 
lives – his daughter’s and that of the patient who would have bought 
his kidney. If his daughter needed a kidney transplant and he do-
nated his kidney to her, he would have been a hero. Radcliff-
Richards correctly asks whether the real issue is not rather the 
poverty situation some people find themselves in, than the trade of 
kidneys.  
The metaphor of “gift of life” suits those concerned with transplants 
and the community at large, because it is easy to understand and it 
fits into religious and cultural ideals about altruism (Siminoff & 
Chillag, 1999:40). It appears as if everyone buys into the notion, yet 
when it comes to actually donating, people are not as generous as 
one would expect. Shouldn’t religious communities, therefore, get 
more actively involved with the reality of organ shortages by advo-
cating the advantages of organ transplants, instead of just support-
ing the emotional slogan, “gift of life”? 
5. Some religious views on altruistic organ donations 
It is necessary to take note of some religious views, as religion plays 
a very important role in people’s behaviour and thus affects how 
they think about organ transplants and their reaction to organ 
donation. Only a few religious groupings’ general views on trans-
plantation will be highlighted to indicate their importance in the 
present context. We can expect there will be no specific views on 
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rewarding a donor but from the general trends of thinking it may be 
possible to infer a position. 
Buddhism (http://www.geocities.com/organdonate/religionculture-
andharvesting.html) view life as a continuum: after the conscious 
mind and brain processes have slipped into death, the spiritual pro-
cess continues. Death is not seen as a disaster, but merely a 
change of consciousness. Therefore, removing a donor’s organs 
and spending vast resources to fit these organs into another body to 
preserve life, appears to a Buddhist as an act of ego delusion, which 
may indicate ignorance of one’s spiritual identity. Clarity of mind is 
crucial during the dying process as it determines the quality of one’s 
next incarnation. Cutting open a donor’s body might be disturbing 
during the evisceration process. Buddhists, therefore, do not con-
demn organ transplants but neither do they promote them. 
Hindus (http://www.donatelifenm.org/religiousviews.htm) are not 
prohibited by their religious laws from donating their organs. It is an 
individual decision. There is nothing in the Hindu religion indicating 
that parts of humans, dead or alive, may not be used to alleviate the 
suffering of other humans. Most religious Indians are Hindu. The 
rites observed after death include burning the intact body in the 
presence of the family. Religious Indians, therefore, do not donate 
organs from cadavers. But religious rites are not the only reason 
why Indians do not donate their organs. India has a poor transport 
system, an extremely hot climate and a shortage of trained trans-
plant surgeons – all of which are essential in organ procurement and 
transplanting processes (Kanniyakonil, 2009). Because their death 
rite results in a severe shortage of transplantable cadaver kidneys in 
India, living donors are mostly used and renders India an ideal target 
for black market activities (Slabbert, 2008:75-99). These illegal prac-
tises could be controlled if India follows the example of Iran.6  
Desai (1988-1990:55) writes about “organ bazaars” in India pro-
curing human organs for sale. He comes to the conclusion that all 
the parties benefit: the recipient gets a healthy organ that can 
prolong life, the donor gets monetary compensation and the hospital 
and physician receive their money. Yet he still feels regulation is 
necessary. He goes on to comment that if the future prospects of an 
                                      
6 In Iran, a regulated system of payment for kidneys was instituted in 1988, which 
eliminated the renal transplantation waiting list. Most donors are living unrelated 
donors who receive a government donor award of health insurance, $ 1 200 (in 
1988) and post-operative drugs and care (cf. Ghods & Savaj, 2006:1136-1145).   
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entire family are changed by the sale of an organ which brings in 
more money than the family might expect to earn in a lifetime, it is 
difficult to take a moral or legal stance against such a transaction. 
He concludes by saying that India and Hinduism need a reinterpre-
tation of ancient wisdom in the context of changed realities.  
The Japanese religion of Shinto has a religious doctrine directly 
against organ harvesting and transplantations. Such actions are 
considered spiritually dirty, and therefore organ transplants are al-
most non-existent in Japan. In 2000 just eight sets of kidneys were 
obtained from dead donors upon family consent. The downside of 
this approach is that Japanese patients become “organ tourists”; 
they travel overseas to buy kidneys (http://geocities.com/organ-
donate/religiouscultureandharvesting.html). 
The brief discussion of a few religions shows how divergent religious 
views on transplantations are and how the followers of each faith 
view transplantations. Yet, what none of them can deny is the con-
stant demand for and shortage of transplantable organs as indicated 
earlier. One possible way of meeting the demand for transplantable 
organs is to compensate donors financially. As indicated, people’s 
views on all aspects of organ transplantations are determined, or at 
least influenced, by religious views. In South Africa Christians and 
Muslims are the strongest religious groupings. How do they see the 
practice of rewarding the donor? What are their arguments for or 
against it? We will firstly discuss some general ideas on financial 
compensation for donors and then move on to the specific religious 
views on this topic.   
6. A possible solution to organ shortages: reward the 
donor financially 
Legislation in South Africa determines that only blood relatives or a 
spouse may donate an organ while alive. However, unrelated living 
organ donations have the potential to satisfy the demand, specifical-
ly for kidneys. 
The reality is that no one, neither a stranger nor a friend, will allow a 
kidney to be harvested while alive, mainly due to two possible 
reasons. The administrative process is cumbersome, as Ministerial 
permission is necessary for such a donation; and secondly, the 
costs involved are high. When you are hospitalised as a recipient of 
an organ, your medical aid will cover the costs, but medical aid 
schemes do not pay for an organ donation. The person giving up a 
kidney, therefore, has to stand proxy for all medical and hospital 
 M. Slabbert, F.D. Mnyongani & N. Goolam 
Koers 76(2) 2011:261-282  273 
expenses as well as the medication. On top of these there is time 
lost at work as well as travelling and accommodation costs. It, there-
fore, seems necessary and fair to reimburse the donor for the costs 
incurred by the donation. If this does not happen, black markets will 
continue. A legalised system of reimbursement, on the other hand, 
would protect donors against unscrupulous middlemen whose sole 
interest is to make a profit. A cash-driven donation system has the 
potential to ensure the safety and dignity of the donors. A paid sys-
tem may also ease human relationships. People who voluntarily do-
nate an organ to a relative are sometimes subjected to greater 
coercion than those who received a reward for their organs because 
of internal pressure from family members to save the loved one. An 
important obstacle in donating organs as living human beings is the 
way in which a body is viewed, which gives the removal of an organ 
a sinister image. The conceptualisation of the body, which is presup-
posed and necessitated by the transplantation process, is mechanis-
tic and disengaged – constituted of organic parts, not an integral 
whole (Marshall et al., 1996:5). This is underscored by the rhetoric 
of donation as “a gift of life”. Joralemon (1995:348) concludes that a 
combination of gift and reward ideologies would perhaps be more 
effective in suppressing the cultural dismissal of a disembodied 
“self”. 
Friedlaender (2002:971-973), an Israeli transplant nephrologist, 
writes that a few years ago he was adamant that rewarding an organ 
donor was wrong and would lead to terrible crimes. He admits, how-
ever, that he became less emotional since he analysed the situation 
at renal transplant clinics. He concludes that it is paternalistic to 
judge a paid kidney donor as poor, ignorant and endangering his 
health. He now supports legislation which will stipulate that the 
donor should be rewarded, as he feels it can then be regulated, 
whereas the present practices cannot (cf. also Slabbert, 2008:75-
99).  
To donate an organ altruistically or to receive a reward for the dona-
tion should be a choice made by an autonomous person. The word 
autonomy7 was first used in correlation with states that were self-
governed. Philosophers adapted this term to be applicable to the 
rights and interests of individuals. Kant taught that a person has a 
free will and can, therefore, decide what should be done in specific 
circumstances, and by implication, he/she is also responsible for 
                                      
7 Autos (Greek) = self; nomos (Greek) = rule. 
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his/her own actions. In other words, being autonomous means doing 
as one ought to, as a rational being (Morgan, 2001:87-88). 
Respect for a person’s autonomy means respect for his/her volun-
tary choices and can be summarised as follows:  
I wish my life and decisions depend on myself, not on external 
forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, 
not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an 
object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which 
are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from 
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody: a doer – deciding, 
not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an 
animal or a slave … I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself 
as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my 
choices and able to explain them by references to my own 
ideas and purposes. (Young, 1998:441.) 
Selling organs or rewarding an organ donor is always and every-
where an emotional issue. The views of religious groups on this 
issue will to a great extent influence how it will be judged. In what 
follows, we focus on the way the two biggest religious groups might 
or should view the rewarding of an organ donor. (For a discussion 
on the general question of the ethics concerning organ selling, cf. 
Slabbert, 2010.) 
6.1 Christian views on organ donation and the payment of 
the donor 
With its different denominations8 and groupings,9 Christianity is the 
worlds’ largest religion with a following of about two billion people. 
Despite the nuanced differences of these denominations and 
groups, theologically the salvation message is the same: God loved 
the world so much that He sent his only son, Jesus Christ, that 
whoever believes in Him should not perish but have life (John 3:16). 
The ministry of Jesus Christ was about the poor, the sick, the 
marginalised and the weak (Mark 14:3-9; Luke 4:16-21). According 
                                      
8 For a list of the different types of Christian denominations, see http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Christian_denominations. Despite these differences, 
this article will use the word Christian in its generic form except where a 
particular denomination or group is the focal point.  
9 For groups such as the Christian Science Tradition, the Manicheans and the 
Gnostics, please see May (1985:38-39). 
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to the salvation history, his gruesome death on the cross was part of 
God’s salvation plan that Jesus Christ should die for the forgiveness 
of sins (John 1:26 and Matt. 26:28). This was the ultimate act of 
altruism (John 17:19). 
The Christian religion encourages any act of altruism, including the 
act of donating an organ whether in life or after death as long as that 
act does not violate the dignity of the human person. In the same 
breath, the Christian religion does not look unfavourably on the reci-
pients of a donated organ. Despite the Christian injunction to be al-
truistic, Christians are still reluctant to donate their organs. Their re-
luctance to altruistically donate may be attributed to their eschato-
logical view of life. Most, if not all Christian denominations believe in 
the resurrection, meaning, that death does not mark the final end to 
one’s life. They believe that they will rise one day (Acts 24:16; Cor. 
35-44). The reluctance may stem from the fact that they do not want 
to be incomplete when they rise. This then creates a tension be-
tween the desire to want to donate, given the fact that altruism is at 
the heart of their faith and the fear of what lies ahead, given their 
eschatological view to life. This tension, we argue, would have been 
there even if there was not a reward given for the donated organ. It 
is our argument, therefore, that if this tension is to be mentioned at 
all, it must be introduced to all debates related to organ donation, 
even where organs are donated altruistically. 
With the supply of altruistically donated organs failing to meet the 
stubbornly increasing demand, there is growing literature calling for 
a reward for anyone who donates (Becker & Elias, 2007:3-22; May, 
1985:38-42). Would Christian theology agree with this? 
Despite the existence of the World Council of Churches,10 Chris-
tians do not have a central body that acts as a deposit of teachings 
common to all denominations and groups. The multiplicity of bodies 
has resulted in nuanced positions on many issues, including the 
question of receiving reward for organ donations. Unlike altruism, 
which draws from the very foundation of the Christian faith, reward 
or incentives for altruism has not received much input from the 
leadership or theologians of the different denominations. Given the 
multiplicity of groups who all operate under the Christian umbrella, it 
therefore becomes difficult to generalise the theological input of one 
                                      
10 The World Council of Churches is a worldwide ecumenical body that consists of 
about 349 churches/church groupings who seek to work together. For further 
reading, see http://www.oikoumene.org 
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group over the rest. This being the case, there is some information 
available from different denominations that provides a basis for un-
derstanding what some of the Christian views are to the question of 
reward or incentives. Two of these will be sampled. 
Within the Catholic Church there is a debate on whether the official 
position of the church endorses acceptance of reward for donating 
an organ or not. This follows a statement that was made by Pope 
Pius XII in 1956 in an address to a group of eye specialists that, “[I]t 
would be going too far to declare immoral every acceptance or every 
demand of payment. The case is similar to blood transfusions. It is 
commendable for the donor to refuse recompense, it is not neces-
sarily a fault to accept it.” (Capaldi, 2000:141.) These words of the 
Pope led Capaldi (2000:141) to conclude that the Catholic Church 
does permit the for-profit sale of human organs for transplantation. 
Without disputing what the Pope had said, Stempsey (2000:197) 
argues that Capaldi did not consider the hierarchy of the importance 
of the different teachings of the Pope. He argues that in the first 
place, what the Pope said seems to be an almost incidental remark 
on the sale of organs. To substantiate this point he makes a dis-
tinction between the various teachings of the Pope. There are those, 
he argues, that are extraordinary in nature, and therefore require 
assent in faith, such as decretal letters. And there are those such as 
homilies, allocutions, radio and television messages that do not 
carry more weight. Stempsey (2000:197) places the speech of the 
Pope in the last category.  
The Bible, a central document to all Christian groups, is silent on the 
matter of receiving a reward for one’s altruism. However, the mes-
sage it gives about human beings created in the image and likeness 
of God, provides some light about the sacredness of a human 
person and the dignity it embodies (Gen. 1:26). In this regard, Pope 
John Paul II (2001:33) stated that,  
Accordingly, any procedure which tend to commercialise human 
organs or to consider them as items of exchange or trade must 
be considered morally unacceptable, because to use the body 
as an object is to violate the dignity of the human person.  
The concept of human dignity, which in the Christian faith is firmly 
rooted in the fact that human beings are created in the image and 
likeness of God and are, therefore, sacred, has further been bol-
stered by Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative which advocates 
that one should not treat oneself or others as means to an end (Gill 
& Sade, 2002:23-30; Cohen, 2002:44-64). The problem with Kant’s 
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view is that it would negate even altruistic organ donations on the 
ground that one is using oneself as a means to an end. The Church 
of England on the other hand, proscribes the sale of organs on the 
basis that an organ is a gift, not a commodity (http://www.cofe. 
anglican.org/news/pr9607.html). Each of the 38 different provinces 
of the Anglican Communion, however, are independent and not all 
of them may subscribe to the views of the Church of England 
(http://en.wikikpedia.org/wiki/Anglican_Communion). This still leaves 
the question open, like in the case of the Catholic Church, as to 
what the exact position is. 
The question as to whether Christians can accept reward for any 
organ donation, has not as yet been answered comprehensively. In 
the absence of a guiding view, individual Christians are left without 
an authoritative teaching on how to approach the topic of receiving a 
reward for organ donation.  
6.2 Islamic views on organ donation and the possible 
financial compensation of donors 
Islam as a religion has its origins in the Arabia of the seventh cen-
tury. Since then the religion has become a faith with approximately a 
thousand million followers spread over the earth. In South Africa, 
Islam has minority status but viewed in the context of Africa, it en-
joys a following of about 40% of the continent’s total population 
(Rossouw et al., 2007:33). The word Islam means peace, but in its 
religious sense it implies engaged, surrender or submission to God 
or Allah’s will. The belief in Islam involves the acceptance of God’s 
oneness and the prophethood of Muhammad. Muhammad is the re-
cipient of the holy scripture of Islam called the Holy Qur’an (Ros-
souw et al., 2007:33). 
The Qur’an states in many verses that Allah is the one giving life 
and ending it. The Qur’an is not for or against organ transplantations 
as such, as it is not addressed directly, but it is reported in a hadith 
that apparently Allah said: “Breaking the bone of a dead person is 
equal [in sinfulness and aggression] to breaking it while that person 
is alive” (Ebrahim & Haffejee, 1989:13). Because of this writing, 
some Muslims question the opening up of a person’s body to re-
move organs. But the Shari’ah, the primary source of Islamic law, 
allows certain actions (although it is against religious interpretations) 
if it is in the interest of a person, for example an incision can be 
made on a pregnant woman in order to save the baby (Ebrahim & 
Haffejee, 1989:13). Thus, if removed organs can benefit another it is 
acceptable, but under strict conditions. It must be the only way of 
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treating the ailment; the success of the transplantation must be high-
ly probable; the donor or the family must have consented to it; and if 
possible transplantation must be between Muslims only (Ebrahim & 
Haffejee, 1989:16). 
Some Muslims also agree with the living donation of a kidney from 
one Muslim to another because the Qur’an stipulates: “Help you one 
another in righteousness and piety.” The hadith adds:   
‘The believers, in their love and sympathy for one another, are 
like a whole body, when one part of it is affected with pain then 
the whole of it responds in terms of wakefulness and fever’ … ‘if 
one is in need of a certain organ and another has one available 
would that not be a gesture of altruism, an act of sharing for the 
benefit of Muslims?’ (Ebrahim & Haffejee, 1989:17.) 
The 1981 Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, endorsed by the First In-
ternational Conference on Islamic Medicine stated that the individual 
is the collective responsibility of society, which has to ensure his 
health needs by any means while inflicting no harm on others. This 
includes the donation of body fluids or organs and is regarded as a 
fard kifayah, which is a compulsory duty that donors fulfil on behalf 
of society. The Shari’ah contains verses which provide support for 
this. The Qur’an states that “they give priority over themselves even 
though they are needy”. The Prophet Muhammad stated in a hadith 
(tradition) that “the faithful in their mutual love and compassion are 
like the body … if one member complains of an ailment all other 
members will rally in response”. This verse and tradition underline 
the fact that one of the five fundamental objectives (maqasid) of the 
Shari’ah is the right to life. Thus, all possible means should be used 
for treating and saving human life, so long as the means used are 
legally acceptable and justifiable (Hathout, 1998-1990:114-116). 
Hathout (1998-1990:115) concludes by saying that donations be-
tween Muslims should be free and voluntarily. Human organs should 
not be treated as commodities for sale, but if there is a dire need, 
and purchase of the organ is the only way it can be procured, then it 
is lawful for the needy buyer (by necessity) although sinful to the 
seller, unless the latter is extremely needy. He suggests a system of 
suitable reward should be devised by a government to prevent or-
gan trafficking.  
7. Conclusion  
Although it is possible to determine the views of different religions on 
organ transplants it is not as easy to determine their stance concern-
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ing a reward to the donor. In the previous sections a few deductions 
were made from Christian and Islamic principles. Apart from reli-
gious concerns in a society based on human rights, personal auto-
nomy should, however, also be honoured. In other words the indivi-
dual must, after informed consent has been given, be allowed to 
donate or to accept reward for a donated organ, justified purely on 
his/her autonomy and personal belief system. Autonomy is doing 
what is right – not because others think it is right. Because you can 
justify it through your personally and freely selected and justified 
view of life, it is exercising control over your own actions in terms of 
your norms. The risk a donor takes is his/hers, not the physician’s or 
ethicist’s. If one decides on an autonomous basis, i.e. freely, ratio-
nally and responsibly to donate an organ, the decision should be 
respected. A decision to accept money for donating an organ should 
be weighed and treated similarly (Munson, 2007:226). 
Marshall et al. (1996:11) advocates a view of “live and let live”. If 
someone chooses to allow the removal of an organ for financial re-
ward, let them; if someone needs money and sells an organ, it 
benefits him/her and is certainly life-saving for the recipient. Gill and 
Sade (2002:39) remind all critics who are against rewarding a donor 
that there is another side to organ transplants: people are waiting for 
organs, especially kidneys, people who will live if they receive the 
organ, if not, will die, or at least suffer needlessly. Critics ought, 
therefore, to consider the complete picture and not only the donor’s 
situation. Also keep in mind that up to now motivating donors to 
donate altruistically has not succeeded.  
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